By Jimmy Carter
October 11, 2006
Atlanta — In 1994 the North Koreans expelled inspectors
of the International Atomic Energy Agency and were threatening
to process spent nuclear fuel into plutonium, giving
them the ability to produce nuclear weapons.
With the risk of war on the Korean Peninsula, there
was a consensus that the forces of South Korea and the
United States could overwhelmingly defeat North Korea.
But it was also known that North Korea could quickly
launch more than 20,000 shells and missiles into nearby
Seoul. The American commander in South Korea, Gen. Gary
Luck, estimated that total casualties would far exceed
those of the Korean War.
Responding to an invitation from President Kim Il-sung
of North Korea, and with the approval of President Bill
Clinton, I went to Pyongyang and negotiated an agreement
under which North Korea would cease its nuclear program
at Yongbyon and permit inspectors from the atomic agency
to return to the site to assure that the spent fuel
was not reprocessed. It was also agreed that direct
talks would be held between the two Koreas.
The spent fuel (estimated to be adequate for a half-dozen
bombs) continued to be monitored, and extensive bilateral
discussions were held. The United States assured the
North Koreans that there would be no military threat
to them, that it would supply fuel oil to replace the
lost nuclear power and that it would help build two
modern atomic power plants, with their fuel rods and
operation to be monitored by international inspectors.
The summit talks resulted in South Korean President
Kim Dae-jung earning the 2000 Nobel Peace Prize for
his successful efforts to ease tensions on the peninsula.
But beginning in 2002, the United States branded North
Korea as part of an axis of evil, threatened military
action, ended the shipments of fuel oil and the construction
of nuclear power plants and refused to consider further
bilateral talks. In their discussions with me at this
time, North Korean spokesmen seemed convinced that the
American positions posed a serious danger to their country
and to its political regime.
Responding in its ill-advised but predictable way, Pyongyang
withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, expelled
atomic energy agency inspectors, resumed processing
fuel rods and began developing nuclear explosive devices.
Six-nation talks finally concluded in an agreement last
September that called for North Korea to abandon all
nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and for
the United States and North Korea to respect each other's
sovereignty, exist peacefully together and take steps
to normalize relations. Each side subsequently claimed
that the other had violated the agreement. The United
States imposed severe financial sanctions and Pyongyang
adopted the deeply troubling nuclear option.
The current military situation is similar but worse
than it was a decade ago: we can still destroy North
Korea's army, but if we do it is likely to result in
many more than a million South Korean and American casualties.
If and when it is confirmed that the recent explosion
in North Korea was nuclear, the international community
will once again be faced with difficult choices.
One option, the most likely one, is to try to force
Pyongyang's leaders to abandon their nuclear program
with military threats and a further tightening of the
embargoes, increasing the suffering of its already starving
people. Two important facts must be faced: Kim Jong-il
and his military leaders have proven themselves almost
impervious to outside pressure, and both China and South
Korea have shown that they are reluctant to destabilize
the regime. This approach is also more likely to stimulate
further nuclear weapons activity.
The other option is to make an effort to put into effect
the September denuclearization agreement, which the
North Koreans still maintain is feasible. The simple
framework for a step-by-step agreement exists, with
the United States giving a firm and direct statement
of no hostile intent, and moving toward normal relations
if North Korea forgoes any further nuclear weapons program
and remains at peace with its neighbors. Each element
would have to be confirmed by mutual actions combined
with unimpeded international inspections.
Although a small nuclear test is a far cry from even
a crude deliverable bomb, this second option has become
even more difficult now, but it is unlikely that the
North Koreans will back down unless the United States
meets this basic demand. Washington's pledge of no direct
talks could be finessed through secret discussions with
a trusted emissary like former Secretary of State Jim
Baker, who earlier this week said, "It's not appeasement
to talk to your enemies."
What must be avoided is to leave a beleaguered nuclear
nation convinced that it is permanently excluded from
the international community, its existence threatened,
its people suffering horrible deprivation and its hard-liners
in total control of military and political policy.
Jimmy Carter, the 39th president, is the founder
of the Carter Center and the winner of the 2002 Nobel
Peace Prize.